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Presentation Overview
• Brief history of NASA Human Spaceflight 
Conjunction Assessment (CA) activities
• Overview of NASA CA process for ISS and 
Shuttle
• Recent examples from Human Spaceflight 
conjunctions
NASA/JSC – Ansley C. Browns
281-244-6487 2
NASA Human Spaceflight
Conjunction Assessment (CA) History
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1988:
Space Shuttle Return to Flight 
STS-25 (Discovery);
Box method used for CA; later 




NASA begins Pc 
development for ISS CA
1998:
ISS First Element 
Launch
1996:
NASA begins conjunction 
assessment of Mir space 
station
1999:
First ISS DAM attempted 
and fails; a few months 
later first ISS DAM 
successfully executed
1990s – present:
NASA works with USSTRATCOM to  
develop tools, data exchange formats, 
improve processes for catalog 
maintenance and CA 
Present:
NASA continues work with 
USSTRATCOM to maintain high 
quality CA for human spaceflight 
and robotic missions
2005:
NASA begins CA for 
robotic missions
1991:
First Shuttle DAM 
performed on 
STS-48 (Discovery)
ISS and Shuttle Conjunction 
Screening and Notification
Screening Volumes (in Kilometers – U x V x W)
10 x 40 x 40:  JSpOC automated notification – refine threat object solution – no NASA notification
2 x 25 x 25:  JSpOC notifies NASA of conjunction – shown above
0.75 x 25 x 25:  NASA notifies larger ISS team – only for ISS or joint ISS/Shuttle conjunctions
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Screening Process
• Every 8 hours, JSpOC screens ISS/Shuttle 
against high accuracy catalog 72 hours into 
the future
• Depending on miss distances, JSpOC 
notifies NASA (see Screening Volumes 
below)
• NASA and JSpOC discuss each conjunction
• If object is a concern
• JSpOC increases tasking on object
• JSpOC provides NASA with more 
frequent updates
+2 km 
- 2 km 
ISS and Shuttle Debris Avoidance 
Processes
• NASA/MCC-Houston (MCC-H) calculates Probability of Collision (Pc) upon 
notification and data from JSpOC
• MCC-H uses Pc along with additional conjunction data to make 
recommendation on Debris Avoidance Maneuver (DAM)
– ISS
• Decision is coordinated between ISS International Partners
• Decision must be made no later than 24 hours prior to conjunction Time of Closest 
Approach
• DAM performed with engines on the Russian Segment of ISS – no crew involvement
– Shuttle
• Decision can be made closer to Time of Closest Approach  
• Crew must be awake to perform DAM
• Flight Rules in place to determine when DAM should be performed based on 
Pc
– Risk  of conjunction is weighed against risk of mission safety and success
– For the Shuttle only, a “box method” downmode is available to make a decision on DAM if Pc 
is not available
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DAM Thresholds
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1E-05 ≤ Pc < 1E-04 ≤ PcPc
ISS/Shuttle DAM Pc Thresholds
Shuttle-only DAM Box Method Downmode Thresholds
Threshold
1 Km (U) x 7 Km (V) x 7 Km (W)
Threshold
0.5 Km (U) x 4 Km (V) x 4 Km (W)
Yellow Red
ISS Debris Avoidance Maneuver
History
More than 700 ISS conjunction notifications to NASA
10 Debris Avoidance Maneuvers Attempted 
5 performed by ISS
1 attempted by ISS, but failed (ISS first attempt)
4 performed by Shuttle during mated operations
Annual Maneuver Rate (theory suggests ~1.2 
maneuvers/year)
~0.9 Maneuvers/year (including failed DAM)
~0.8 Maneuvers/year (not including failed DAM)
Date Debris Vehicle Notes
06/13/99 SL-3 Rocket Body FGB
Maneuver Execution FAILED.  
Two Red Pc violations early in event based on bad data
10/26/99 Pegasus Rocket Body FGB First successful ISS DAM and only DAM performed by FGB.
09/29/00 SL-3 Rocket Body Progress Yellow Pc threshold violation
02/10/01 Unknown Debris STS-98 Shuttle Box method used
12/15/01 SL-8 Rocket Body STS-108 Shuttle Pc method used
05/15/02 SL-8 Rocket Body Progress Red Pc threshold violation
05/30/03 MEGSAT Progress Red Pc threshold violation
08/27/08 COSMOS 2421 Debris ATV-1
Red Pc threshold violation
Largest PC calculated to date
03/22/09 CZ-4 Debris STS-119
Red Pc threshold violations on consecutive orbits (~50 )
Conjunction orbits were during an EVA
Retrograde DAM was executed early by having orbiter hold attitude
07/18/09 Unknown Debris STS-127
Conjunction occurred 15 hours after STS-127 docking during crew sleep.
Red Pc threshold violation  post-docking
DAM performed by the Shuttle before the crew went to sleep
NASA/JSC – Ansley C. Browns
281-244-6487 7
Shuttle Debris Avoidance Maneuver 
History from 3 Shuttle Flights 
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Date Debris Flight Notes
08/11/07 Delta Rocket Body STS-118
No maneuver for very close conjunction 
Notification too late (18 minutes prior to time of conjunction)
03/11/08 USA-193 Debris STS-123 Existing burn modified, used box method
03/25/08 Breeze-M Debris STS-123 Existing burn modified, although no Pc violation
11/28/08 Cosmos 2421 Debris STS-126
Separation burn delayed several hours to avoid Yellow Pc 
violation
• Typically Shuttle modifies existing burns for Debris Avoidance rather 
than adding a burn for a high risk conjunction
• On average, approximately 5-10 conjunction notifications are 
received during Shuttle mission
– Of those, usually 1-2 at most are serious enough to require a modification to a burn
Recent ISS/Shuttle
Conjunction Examples
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August 27, 2008:  
COSMOS 2421 debris
• Notable for:  First ISS DAM attempted in 5 years, Retrograde DAM
• Retrograde DAM – performing a posigrade DAM would violate Soyuz 
launch and landing constraints, as well as Shuttle rendezvous altitude 
constraints
• DAM Clearing Assessment was very difficult due to multiple conjunctions 
in the vicinity if the DAM was performed
– Eventually found a 1.0 m/s option that was technically clear with respect to 
Flight Rules (no post-burn conjunction within 48 hours of a maneuver)
– The DAM option chosen with the best prospects still had one object 
(different piece of Cosmos 2421 debris) that could be a potential problem 3 
days into the future
• New COSMOS 2421 Debris
– DAM was nominal for original debris which resulted in a predicted 
conjunction with another piece of Cosmos 2421 debris 3 days later
– DAM planning to avoid the 2nd piece of debris began soon after the previous 
DAM executed
– Ultimately, the Pc dropped below the yellow threshold and DAM was not 
performed




• Notable for:  Late notification, crew placed in Soyuz
• Complicating factors
– High eccentricity 
– High radial velocity 
– Extremely high drag
– Low inclination 
– Small radar cross section 
– Space weather prediction of geomagnetic spike did not occur as 
expected
• Notification from JSpOC
– TOPO notified at TCA-42 hours that a piece of PAM-D debris 
would enter 2x25x25 km box
• Usual screening horizon is 72 hours
– At TCA-19 hours, prediction entered 0.75 x 25 x 25 km box
• At this point, TOPO informed Russians and ISS Flight Control Team
• ISS DAM template kick off process NLT TCA-28.5 hours




• Notable for:  Retrograde mated DAM during STS-119
– MCC-H had been monitoring this repeating conjunction as a “no threat” item
• Object had similar orbital period to the ISS/STS stack, so there were TCAs on multiple 
consecutive orbits
– ISS/STS stack had a Loss of Attitude Control at ~TCA-48 hours, which pushed the 
radial miss distances much closer (within the 0.75 x 25 x 25 km box)
– Probability of Collision calculations showed multiple red threshold violations
– TCAs would occur during the next spacewalk
– The posigrade delta-V needed to be safe would violate the rendezvous conditions 
necessary for the upcoming Soyuz – a small retrograde maneuver was planned
• DAM was unique in that it was performed using the Shuttle to hold attitude control such that 
an overall retrograde trajectory perturbation was accomplished
• Due to the retrograde DAM, this object ultimately showed up as a repeating 
conjunction again in the week following STS-119 undocking.  
– No PC threshold violations occurred and no action was necessary
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April 9, 2009: 
Fengyun 1C debris
• Notable for:  DAM planning initiated on account of post-
Soyuz undocking trajectory
• Complicating factors:
– Pre-undock trajectory indicated no DAM planning would be 
required
– Soyuz undocking at TCA-30 hours moved ISS to <1 km total miss 
from Fengyun at TCA (though larger radial miss)
– Since collision probability requires JSpOC ISS covariance, MCC-H 
had to wait for several USSTRATCOM tracks
• Immediate ISS GPS vector from indicated a likely low-Pc
• DAM cancelled 4 hours later, as expected, following post-undock ISS 
tracking
• The object was relatively easy to track and predict
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May 16, 2010: 
Unknown Debris
• Notable for:  TCA occurred ~1 hour after STS-132 docking
• NASA notified 72 hours prior to TCA
– Approximately 24 hours prior to STS-132 launch
• Docking perturbations would invalidate the Pc method
• Not enough time post-docking to track the mated stack to get an accurate 
prediction
• Trajectory teams discussed the option of having ISS perform a stand-alone 
DAM the evening prior to docking.  However, this would require ISS to make a 
decision to perform a DAM without official Pc.
• Trajectory teams discussed the possibility of having the Orbiter delay docking 
to ensure a good PC
• After NASA analysis, teams became comfortable that the perturbations from 
docking activities would not be large enough to statistically affect the overall 
risk
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Questions?
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